Monday, June 30, 2008
Doing our duty
How do we know our duty? The answer given by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) continues to be the foundation of deontological ethics. Kant lived a century after Isaac Newton explained the mechanics of the world without relying on divine intervention (except for the act of creation), which may be why Kant shunned religious reasoning despite being a Christian. Kant claimed to rely on reason alone in asserting that our duty is simply to do what is rational.
More than a century and a half later, when colonized societies in Africa and Asia were struggling for independence, Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) transformed the Hindu idea of duty, which is rooted in the caste traditions of Indian culture, into an imperative to seek truth-power (satyagraha) through non-violent action (ahimsa). For Gandhi, too, our duty is rational.
Kant argued that reason enables us to do our duty because it reflects the moral law within us. Doing our duty means acting on our conscience, which Kant saw as our rational nature. Actions are ethical, he asserted, when we do with a good will what reason reveals to be right. This does not mean acting to achieve the best consequences. Instead, it means acting rationally with good intentions.
For Kant, an ethical principle is rational if we all, as rational beings, agree that it may be applied without any exceptions. Such a categorical imperative, he argued, is the opposite of hypothetical thinking, which involves conditional statements, such as: "I would take an action, if I thought it would have primarily beneficial consequences."
Kant reasoned that acting in a way which has universal application requires respecting the dignity of every person. Our autonomy is linked to our rationality, which is distinctly human. Therefore, we contradict ourselves and act irrationally, if we treat other persons as less than ends in themselves, by using them as means to gain our own ends.[1]
Moral philosophers rely on Kant’s deontological argument on behalf of our rationality and autonomy to justify asserting the rights of individuals. Chapter 7 considers this argument and the development of human rights law.
[1] Kant’s categorical “is often stated in two forms: 1) Act only on that maxim [ethical presumption] through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. 2) Act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never as a means.” See Robert Traer and Harlan Stelmach, Doing Ethics in a Diverse World, chapter 4, for a more detailed presentation.
More than a century and a half later, when colonized societies in Africa and Asia were struggling for independence, Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) transformed the Hindu idea of duty, which is rooted in the caste traditions of Indian culture, into an imperative to seek truth-power (satyagraha) through non-violent action (ahimsa). For Gandhi, too, our duty is rational.
Kant argued that reason enables us to do our duty because it reflects the moral law within us. Doing our duty means acting on our conscience, which Kant saw as our rational nature. Actions are ethical, he asserted, when we do with a good will what reason reveals to be right. This does not mean acting to achieve the best consequences. Instead, it means acting rationally with good intentions.
For Kant, an ethical principle is rational if we all, as rational beings, agree that it may be applied without any exceptions. Such a categorical imperative, he argued, is the opposite of hypothetical thinking, which involves conditional statements, such as: "I would take an action, if I thought it would have primarily beneficial consequences."
Kant reasoned that acting in a way which has universal application requires respecting the dignity of every person. Our autonomy is linked to our rationality, which is distinctly human. Therefore, we contradict ourselves and act irrationally, if we treat other persons as less than ends in themselves, by using them as means to gain our own ends.[1]
Moral philosophers rely on Kant’s deontological argument on behalf of our rationality and autonomy to justify asserting the rights of individuals. Chapter 7 considers this argument and the development of human rights law.
[1] Kant’s categorical “is often stated in two forms: 1) Act only on that maxim [ethical presumption] through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. 2) Act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never as a means.” See Robert Traer and Harlan Stelmach, Doing Ethics in a Diverse World, chapter 4, for a more detailed presentation.
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